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Abstract 
 
Short-term corporate debt as a proportion of total debt issued by public firms varies 
greatly across countries, between 28% in the U.S. and 78% in China. This paper 
argues that the interaction between information asymmetry and legal protection of 
creditors is an important determinant of debt maturity. When short-term debt plays a 
dual role as signalling and commitment devices, a reduction in information 
asymmetry has a larger impact on debt maturity when creditor rights are weaker. We 
find empirical support for this prediction using firm-level data from 45 countries 
around the world. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A common problem faced by many firms around the world is the limited availability of 
long-term sources of funds. Exclusive reliance on short-term borrowing may expose companies to 
rollover risk and reduce their overall growth potential. The inability to rollover short-term debt 
may lead to insolvency for even positive net-present-value projects. During the period of 1991-
2010, the proportion of total debt issued by public firms that has a maturity of less than one year 
ranges between 28% in the U.S. and 78% in China (see Table 1). This suggests that country 
characteristics are important determinants of variations in debt maturity structure. It also implies 
that the impact of debt rollover risks on the real economy varies greatly around the world. Although 
the negative implications of excessive short-term borrowing on growth and stability are well 
known (e.g. Chang and Velasco, 2001 and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998), there is no 
consensus on its underlying determinants and hence the main priorities for reform. To address 
these issues, many countries have embarked on policies and institutions promoting the 
development of long-term loan or bond markets with mixed results. 
 This paper argues that the interaction between information asymmetry and legal protection 
of creditors is an important determinant of debt maturity. Existing models do not yield a prediction 
on how information asymmetry and creditor protection interact in determining debt maturity. A 
clear understanding of this interaction is necessary both for a meaningful empirical analysis and 
for policy recommendations. In this paper, we develop a simple two-period model that involves 
both ex-ante asymmetric information and the possibility of ex-post diversion of cash flows by 
entrepreneurs. The extent of diversion depends on the degree of creditor protection. In our model, 
short-term debt plays a dual role from an entrepreneur’s perspective: i) as a signaling device to 
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convey favorable information to the market and, ii) as a commitment device to restrict ex-post 
diversion of cash flows.1 A novel and sharp empirical prediction of our model is that a reduction 
in information asymmetry acts as a substitute for creditor protection in lengthening debt maturity: 
more specifically, the effect of information asymmetry on debt maturity is stronger when creditor 
rights are weaker. 
A simple intuition underlies our theoretical results. When creditor rights are relatively 
strong, the signaling role of short-term debt prevails as the safe firms issue a small amount of short-
term debt to credibly signal their type and separate themselves from the risky firms. In this case, 
creditor rights have little impact on debt maturity. When creditor rights become weaker, short-
term debt is no longer an effective signaling device and both types of firms use some level of short-
term debt to commit to restricting ex-post diversion of cash flows. Short-term debtholders can 
credibly threaten to liquidate a firm in case of diversion, as they have no claim to the long-term 
cash flows. The threat of liquidation by short-term financiers makes the entrepreneurs’ 
commitment credible even when creditor rights are relatively weak. The weaker the creditor rights, 
the higher the level of short-term debt that is required to act as a commitment device. In the 
benchmark case of full information, long-term debt is chosen by both types of firms to minimize 
transaction costs. Hence a reduction in information asymmetry has a larger impact on debt maturity 
when creditor rights are weaker.   
We test the main predictions of the model using firm-level data from 45 countries for the 
1991-2010 period. Institutions facilitating sharing of credit information such as public and private 
credit registries reduce information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers (Jappelli and 
                                                      
1 From a lender’s perspective, short-term debt is used as a screening device to overcome information asymmetry, and 
a discipline device to cope with ex-post diversion. 
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Pagano, 1993; Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2009; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (henceforth 
DMS), 2007). Therefore, we use information sharing among creditors as an empirical proxy for a 
reduction in information asymmetry while controlling for the impact of legal enforcement, 
financial development and other macro and micro factors on debt maturity structure. We also use 
reforms of credit reporting systems around the world as our laboratory for quasi-natural 
experiments. A difference-in-difference approach is employed to further exploit the within-country 
variations in debt maturity around the reforms. 
The main empirical findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, a higher 
degree of information sharing among creditors, i.e. lower information asymmetry, is associated 
with a higher share of long-term debt as a proportion of total corporate debt in both developed and 
developing countries. The results are very robust with respect to alternative measures of 
information sharing, different control variables, and different estimation methodology. This 
suggests that information sharing helps reduce problems of adverse selection and ex-post moral 
hazard in the bank-firm relationship. Second, countries with weaker creditor rights or higher 
corruption are characterized by higher ratios of short-term debt to total debt in the corporate sector. 
This is consistent with short-term lending as a commitment device to restrict ex-post diversion of 
cash flows.  
Third and most importantly, there exists an interactive effect between information sharing 
and creditor rights. More specifically, corporate debt maturity is less sensitive to creditor rights 
(information sharing) in the presence of information sharing (strong creditor protection). This 
supports our theory which predicts that the effect of information asymmetry on debt maturity is 
weaker when creditor rights are stronger.  
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Finally, certain aspects of credit bureaus and bankruptcy laws are particularly important 
for lengthening debt maturity. They include regulations requiring that both positive and negative 
credit information are distributed and that secured creditors are paid first in bankruptcy. In 
addition, some aspects of the collateral law, especially those regarding how firms’ assets can be 
used as collateral, also seem to matter for debt maturity. This supports the view of collateral as a 
debt contracting device (Rajan and Winton, 1995; Vig, 2013).  
Overall, our findings suggest that a reduction in information asymmetry has a stronger 
effect on debt maturity when creditor rights are weaker. The interaction between information 
asymmetry and legal protection of creditors is an important determinant of debt maturity.  
The paper contributes to the literature over three important dimensions. First, our 
theoretical model contributes to the literature on debt maturity by bringing together ideas from 
asymmetric information (Flannery, 1986; Diamond, 1991) and limited contract enforcement (Hart 
and Moore, 1994; Diamond, 2004). The interaction between these two forces, which was not 
analysed in previous models, gives rise to the novel prediction that the effect of information 
asymmetry on debt maturity is stronger when creditor rights are weaker.2 That is, our model offers 
the new insight that the signalling role of short-term debt is ineffective when the legal environment 
is relatively weak. The model also adds to the literature on the relation between legal system and 
financing choices of firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, (henceforth LLSV), 
1997 and 1998) by arguing that creditor rights interact with information asymmetry in influencing 
debt contracting.  
                                                      
2 In two polar cases the predictions of our model are similar to previous ones: i) under asymmetric information with 
perfect creditor rights, our results are the same as in Flannery (1986) where short-term debt is a signaling device; and 
ii) when diversion (i.e. ex-post moral hazard) is a severe problem without asymmetric information, our results are 
similar to those in Hart and Moore (1994) and Diamond (2004) who model short-term debt as a commitment device. 
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Second, we extend the literature on the roles of information sharing institutions. Previous 
research shows that information sharing among creditors helps lenders select good borrowers and 
overcome moral hazard of borrowers (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993; Padilla and Pagano, 2000), and 
contributes to higher volumes of lending/borrowing activities (DMS, 2007), lower costs of 
financing (Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2009), lower corruption in banking lending (Barth, Lin, 
Lin, and Song, 2009) and higher economic growth (Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma, 2010). This paper 
analyses the maturity dimension through which information sharing influences credit markets.  
Third, we contribute to the empirical literature on the determinants of corporate debt 
maturity across countries (e.g. Dermirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Giannetti, 2003, Fan, 
Titman, and Twite, 2012). While previous studies capture the impact of legal institutions by legal 
origins and corruption, our paper is the first to study the complex effects of information sharing 
and creditor rights, and the interaction between these institutions, on debt maturity. We also study 
the causal impact of information on debt maturity by employing a difference-in-difference 
empirical strategy.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 
presents our theoretical model and develops testable hypotheses on information sharing and 
creditor rights as determinants of debt maturity. Section 4 introduces the data, and Section 5 
discusses the empirical results and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes and draws some policy 
implications. 
 
2. THE RELATED LITERATURE 
2.1 Debt maturity  
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Stiglitz (1974) extended Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) irrelevance result to debt maturity 
in perfect markets. Since then the literature in corporate finance on debt maturity choices has 
identified a variety of imperfections in capital markets that can explain why the choice of maturity 
in fact matters.  
Under various assumptions, the decision to borrow at short-term maturities has been 
modelled in the corporate finance literature as a solution to debt-related agency problems (Myers, 
1977; Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet, 1980), driven by the fear of early project termination by 
uninformed investors (Von Thadden, 1995), or as the consequence of illiquidity problems and 
inadequate regulation and institutions (Diamond and Rajan, 2001).  
A number of theoretical studies explain why risky firms with long-term projects might 
borrow on a short-term basis in the presence of asymmetric information. Using a signalling 
framework, Flannery (1986) shows that firms with favorable insider information may distinguish 
their quality by issuing short-term debt and roll it over, provided issuing costs are sufficiently high. 
The model predicts that debt maturity is shorter when there are more information asymmetries and 
less risk. By incorporating liquidity risk into a framework similar to that in Flannery’s model, 
Diamond (1991) shows that debt maturity is a non-monotonic function of risk ratings: the shortest 
maturity for both the lowest and highest risk ratings. Rajan (1992) analyses how information 
asymmetries and bargaining power affect the choice between short- and long-term debts from 
arm’s length lenders, and Diamond (1993) links the choice of maturity with the choice of seniority 
of debt contracts under asymmetric information.   
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A number of empirical studies have focused on the impact of information asymmetries on 
the choice of debt maturity by firms within individual countries (mainly the US).3 Using loan-level 
data for the US, Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, and Miller (2005) investigate the importance of 
information asymmetries and credit risk ratings for loan maturity choices. They find that 
information asymmetries reduce loan maturities and, consistent with Diamond (1991), the 
relationship between debt maturity and risk ratings is found to be stronger when information 
asymmetries are higher. Furthermore, recent research also shows that managerial stock ownership 
and executive compensation influences corporate debt maturity (Datta, Iskendar-Datta, and 
Raman, 2005; Brockman, Martin, and Unlu, 2010). Custódio, Ferreira, and Laureano (2013) show 
that the use of short-term corporate debt has increased in the US over the past decades. The 
decrease in debt maturity was driven by firms with high information asymmetry.  
There is also a growing literature on how institutional differences across countries 
influence maturity choices (see, Dermirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Giannetti, 2003; Fan, 
Titman, and Twite, 2012). In the spirit of the law and finance literature initiated by LLSV (1997), 
the above empirical papers capture the effects of legal systems by variables such as legal origins 
and corruption. 
Our paper contributes to the empirical literature by investigating the inter-country 
variations of the structure of corporate debt maturity. We focus on the impact of institutions aiming 
at reducing credit information asymmetries or protecting creditor rights. To the best of our 
knowledge, our paper is the first to study the effects of these institutions, and the interaction 
between them, as fundamental determinants of debt maturity structure.  
 
                                                      
3 See, Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), Stoh and Mauer (1996), Barclay, Marx and Smith (2003), 
Johnson (2003), and Billett, King and Mauer (2007) for the US studies. 
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2.2 Information sharing and creditor rights 
When banks consider loan applications, they can gather credit information from applicants 
and engage in direct screening. Alternatively, they can acquire this information from an 
information sharing institution who record borrowers’ characteristics, credit history (positive 
and/or negative), and current debt exposure to other lenders. The institution can be either public 
(government-owned) or private credit bureaus.  
Previous studies show that these information sharing institutions help the development of 
private credit markets (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; DMS, 2007; Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano, 
2009). They contribute to less severe financial constraints faced by firms in developing countries 
(Galindo and Miller, 2001), better access to credit (Barron and Staten, 2003) and better firm 
performance (Kallberg and Udell, 2003). In addition, the literature finds that information sharing 
helps lenders to select good borrowers (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993), overcome moral hazard of 
borrowers (Padilla and Pagano, 2000), reduce non-performing loans and the costs of firm financing 
(Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2009), reduce corruption in bank lending (Barth, Lin, Lin, and Song, 
2009), decrease bank risk-taking and lead to higher economic growth (Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma, 
2010). Experimental evidence by Brown and Zehnder (2010) confirms that a credit registry 
motivates borrowers to repay loans. Our paper adds to this literature by analyzing the maturity 
dimension upon which information sharing influences credit markets. 
Economic theory suggests that limited enforcement influences the contracting environment 
(Hart and Moore, 1994). The seminal papers by LLSV (1997 and 1998) relate creditor rights to 
countries’ financial development. Diamond (2004) argues that in legal systems with ineffective 
contract enforcement, debt maturity becomes shorter. In a model of multiple-bank lending, 
Bennardo, Pagano, and Piccolo (2015) analyse the role of information sharing and creditor rights 
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for credit market efficiency. Empirical evidence suggests that creditor rights and the enforceability 
of contracts matter to debt contracting (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009).  
Creditor rights may also influence debt maturity. Stronger creditor protection gives 
creditors more power in bankruptcy: creditors are more likely to force repayment, take collateral, 
and gain control of borrowers in case of financial distress of borrowers. This limits the extent of 
ex-post diversion of cash flows by other stakeholders, including managers, shareholders, and 
governments. Hence creditors are more willing to face the higher risk of diversion associated with 
longer-term finance.  
Creditor rights may also interact with information sharing in affecting debt maturity. For 
example, the impact of information sharing on debt maturity may be weaker in countries with 
stronger creditor rights: when creditors have strong power ex-post to limit the possibility of 
diversion cash flows, e.g. by replacing firms’ management in bankruptcy, they may be willing to 
lend long-term even in the absence of information sharing.  
We formalize the above ideas in a theoretical model to isolate different forces in action. 
Our model involves both ex-ante asymmetric information and the possibility of ex-post diversion 
of cash flows by entrepreneurs. The extent of diversion depends on the degree of creditor 
protection. We bring together two strands of the literature: i) the signalling role of debt maturity 
under asymmetric information (Flannery, 1986; Diamond, 1991), and ii) the effects of limited 
contract enforcement on debt contracting (Hart and Moore, 1994; Diamond, 2004). We also 
contribute to the law and finance literature by arguing that creditor rights interact with information 
asymmetry in influencing debt contracting. Our paper is the first to study, both theoretically and 
empirically, the complex effects of the interaction between these frictions on debt maturity. 
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3. THEORY 
 
3.1 The Model 
We consider a simple, stylized two-period model of financing under asymmetric 
information. The time line and key aspects of the model are summarized in Figure 1. There are 
three dates, t= 0, 1, and 2, and two groups of agents, i.e. entrepreneurs and financiers. 
Entrepreneurs have no initial wealth. At date 0, each entrepreneur needs to make an investment of 
amount I to undertake an indivisible project that generates cash flows over two periods. The 
entrepreneur chooses the optimal maturity structure of debt to fund this investment: he does so by 
issuing short-term debt, long-term debt, or a mix between the two types of debt. Short-term debt 
matures at date 1 whereas long-term debt matures at date 2. Each issuance of short-term or long-
term debt implies a fixed transaction cost, c. Both entrepreneurs and financiers are risk neutral. 
The risk-free interest rate is zero. For simplicity, we assume that there are two financiers who are 
involved in Bertrand competition. Our focus is the entrepreneur’s choice of short-term debt as a 
fraction of total debt issued.  
 There are two types of projects, S (safe) and R (risky). Their proportions in the project 
population are l  and  l-1  (where 10 << l ), respectively. The project type is private 
information of the entrepreneur at date 0. The S-type project generates cash-flow SX  with 
certainty at both dates 1 and 2. At date 1, the R-type project yields cash-flow RX  with probability 
p  (where 0<p<1) or 0 with probability p-1 . At date 2, the R-type project yields RX  with 
certainty. The cash flows generated at date 1 can be reinvested at the risk-free interest rate of zero. 
Both types of projects have positive net present-value. They also have the same expected return 
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(i.e. mean-preserving spreads): 02)1( >-=-+= IXIXpNPV SR . We assume IXX RS <<<0
.  
 At both dates 1 and 2, the entrepreneur may divert a fraction q of the cash flows, where 
10 <£ q .4 The fraction q is inversely related to the degree of creditor protection. Debt repayment 
is not fully enforced, i.e. cash flows diverted by the entrepreneur at any given q cannot be claimed 
by financiers. If cash flows at date 1 are inadequate to meet debt service requirements because of 
diversion, short-term debtholders may liquidate the project. However, if the project yields zero 
cash-flow at date 1, short-term debtholders allow the project to continue and the debt is due at date 
2. In this case, the entrepreneur incurs a non-monetary cost of financial distress, C . In the 
benchmark case of full information, the type of the project is known to all agents and the 
entrepreneurs can be costlessly forced to use the cash flows generated by the firm to repay debt 
(i.e. debt repayment is enforced at zero cost). 5  
 
3.2 The main result 
We consider two different cases: i) The benchmark case of full information, and ii) the 
presence of asymmetric information. Our main results are summarized in the following 
proposition: 
 
                                                      
4 The literature has considered two forms of moral hazard: i) ex-ante (effort) moral hazard and ii) diversion of cash 
flow which is an ex-post moral hazard problem. These two forms of moral hazard problems could generate the same 
predictions, only under certain conditions. 
5 Alternative approaches to allowing for diversion include costly diversion (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002), or costly 
debt enforcement (Diamond, 2004). In these cases, the cost of diversion (debt enforcement) increases (decreases) with 
the amount of available information. For example, better information on credit history makes earnings manipulation 
more difficult, which increases (decreases) the cost of diversion (debt enforcement). This would capture the notion 
that ex-post moral hazard is less severe as the degree of information asymmetry is lower. Such models would give the 
same result as our simple model if the cost of diversion is prohibitively high (or the cost of debt enforcement is 
sufficiently low) under full information. 
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PROPOSITION:  
i) In the benchmark case of full information:  
For anyq, both types of projects are financed by only long-term debt.  
ii) Under asymmetric information: 
a) For qq ££0 , under certain conditions, there exists a separating equilibrium: the S-type 
project is financed by a mix of long-term debt and a small amount of short-term debt, whereas the 
R-type project is financed by long-term debt only.  
b) For Pqqq £< , there exists a pooling equilibrium where both types of projects are 
financed by a mix of short-term debt and long-term debt. The ratio of the amount of short-term 
debt over the total amount of funds raised, I, increases withq. 
 
Proof: See Internet Appendix. 
 
The main results of the model are summarized in Figure 2. The intuition of our results is 
summarized as follows. In the benchmark case of full information, long-term debt is chosen by 
both types of firms to minimize transaction costs. Under asymmetric information, when the 
fraction of cash flows that can be diverted (q) is low, the R-type project can fund investment, I, by 
issuing only long-term debt. S-type projects issue a minimal amount of short-term debt to credibly 
signal their type.  
When the fraction q  becomes higher than a threshold (q ), financiers cannot recover their 
investments, I, if the R-type project is financed by only long-term debt. Therefore the R-type 
project reluctantly issues some short-term debt, in addition to long-term debt, and the separating 
equilibrium collapses. In the resulting pooling equilibrium, both types of firms issue some level of 
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short-term debt to commit to limiting diversion of the intermediate cash flows on date 1. Borrowing 
short-term is a credible commitment even when creditor rights are relatively weak, as short-term 
financiers can threaten to liquidate a firm in case of diversion. More specifically, if liquidation 
happens entrepreneurs lose the opportunity to capture future cash flows that can be diverted. Hence 
entrepreneurs prefer repaying short-term debt than diverting intermediate profits and being 
liquidated. As long as the fraction q  is lower than a threshold ( Pq ), both types of firms are financed 
and financiers in expectation recover their funds. The higher is the fraction q, the more short-term 
debt is used as a commitment device. 
 
3.3 Empirical Implications 
 
This section derives three empirically testable hypotheses from our model, which are 
labelled as the signalling hypothesis, the commitment hypothesis, and the substitution hypothesis. 
Figure 3 illustrates our theoretical model with a numerical example. Suppose that 
3.0/,8.0,5.0 === INPVpl . Note that the choice of parameters does not affect our main results. 
In the internet appendix, we derive the thresholds of q (i.e. q  and Pq ). Panel A plots the average 
short-term debt to total debt ratio as a function of q. We assume that the ratio in the separating 
equilibrium is minimal at 2%.  Panel B plots the interest rates of long-term debt, short-term debt, 
and total debt as a function of q. We note that in the pooling equilibrium, the yield of short-term 
debt does not depend on q, whereas the average yield of total debt issued increases with q  due 
to the higher ratio of short-term to total debt.  
Panel A of Figure 3 shows that entrepreneurs use a higher level of short-term debt under 
asymmetric information than under full information. This confirms the simple intuition that short-
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term debt acts as a signalling device to overcome adverse selection. Our testable Hypothesis 1 is 
the following: 
· Signalling hypothesis: A reduction in information asymmetry is associated with a lower 
ratio of short-term debt to total debt.  
 
In the pooling equilibrium under asymmetric information, a higher fraction of cash flows 
that can be diverted is associated with a higher level of short-term debt (see Panel A of Figure 3). 
Therefore, the higher the fraction q, the more short-term debt is employed as a commitment device. 
As mentioned before, the fraction of diversion is inversely related to the degree of creditor 
protection: the lower the degree of creditor protection, the higher the fraction of output 
entrepreneurs can divert. This leads to the following testable Hypothesis 2: 
· Commitment hypothesis: Better creditor protection is associated with a lower ratio of 
short-term debt to total debt.   
 
Panel A of Figure 3 also shows that the difference in levels of short-term debt under 
asymmetric information and those under full information depends on the fraction of cash flows 
that entrepreneurs can divert. This difference captures the effect of the degree of information 
asymmetry on debt maturity at any given q. When creditor protection is relatively strong (i. e. q  
is relatively low), the difference is small and does not depend on creditor rights. Hence the 
signaling role of short-term debt prevails in a strong legal system where a separating equilibrium 
exists. When creditor rights are relatively weak (i. e. q  is relatively high), the difference in short-
term debt becomes larger. Hence, the higher the fraction q, the higher the effect of information 
asymmetry on debt maturity. This implies that when creditor protection becomes weaker, a 
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reduction in information asymmetry reduces the use of short-term debt as a commitment device. 
In this case, information sharing among creditors facilitates debt enforcement and acts as a 
substitute for creditor protection in lengthening debt maturity. This leads to our key empirical 
prediction (Hypothesis 3): 
· Substitution hypothesis: The effect of a reduction in information asymmetry on debt 
maturity decreases with the level of creditor protection. 
 
  It has been argued that information sharing among creditors leads to lower information 
asymmetry (Jappelli and Pagano, 1993; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007). Therefore, in our 
empirical analysis we use credit information sharing as a proxy for a reduction in information 
asymmetry while controlling for legal enforcement, financial development and other macro and 
micro factors that may affect debt maturity structure.6 
  In sum, our model combines elements of two different types of models, i.e. ex-ante 
asymmetric information and ex-post moral hazard models. The predictions of our model are 
similar to the existing ones in the two polar cases: i) Asymmetric information with perfect creditor 
rights (q=0) where the results are the same as in Flannery (1986), and ii) Diversion (i.e. ex-post 
moral hazard) is a severe problem (q  is very high) without asymmetric information, in which case 
the results are similar to those in Hart and Moore (1994) and Diamond (2004). However, the 
interaction between these two forces, which was not analysed before, gives rise to the novel 
                                                      
6 Based on our model, information sharing among creditors affects debt maturity through two distinct channels. First, 
information sharing helps reduce the information asymmetry when a lending decision is made. This leads to longer 
debt maturities as firms are less willing to engage in costly signalling through short-term debt. Second, information 
sharing facilitates debt enforcement. This enhances borrowers’ incentive to repay loans and reduces the need for short-
term debt as a commitment device. Our simple, stylized theory abstains from modelling the incentives for creditors to 
share information and the impact on borrower base and competition, which has been extensively discussed in the 
literature (e.g. Pagano and Jappelli, 1993; Bouckaert and Degryse, 2004).  
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prediction that the effect of information asymmetry on debt maturity is stronger when creditor 
rights are weaker. 
 
4. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
In order to examine the determinants of the debt maturity structure of firms in countries at 
different levels of development, we construct a novel database including a number of institutional, 
macro- and micro-economic variables, as briefly illustrated below.  
We measure the debt maturity structure of a firm by the ratio of short-term interest-bearing 
debt (i.e. debt obligations with maturity less than one year) to total interest-bearing debt in the 
firm’s balance sheet using the WorldScope. We calculate this ratio across firms for all countries 
for which we have data for at least 50 firms, and these firms represent more than 30 percent of the 
stock market capitalization in that country. We exclude banks, insurance, and other financial firms. 
This leads to our sample of a total of 40,474 publicly listed firms in 45 countries over the period 
1991-2010. Although we only have data for publicly listed firms, which tend to be relatively large 
firms, we expect that the effects of credit information and creditor rights on debt maturity would 
be stronger for smaller unlisted firms. Table 1 presents a description of the cross sectional 
characteristics of the sample.  
 
4.1 Measuring information asymmetry 
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As postulated in Section 3, a reduction in information asymmetry is likely to increase the 
maturity horizon at which financial institutions feel safe to lend. As information sharing among 
creditors reduces information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, we employ several 
measures of information sharing among lenders. The main sources for our data are the World 
Bank/IFC “Doing Business” database as well as the World Bank Public and Private Credit 
Registries Surveys. In addition, we obtain the credit registries establishment dates from Miller 
(2003), Love and Mylenko (2003), and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). 
Following DMS (2007), our first measure D Information Sharing is an indicator variable 
regarding the existence of an information sharing institution (i.e. a public registry or private 
bureau). The second variable Depth of Credit Information is an index measuring the rules affecting 
the scope, accessibility, and quality of credit information available through either public or private 
credit registries. The data are collected from the World Bank/IFC “Doing Business” database. A 
value of one is added to the index for each of the following six aspects of a public or private credit 
registry (or both): (i) both positive credit information (e.g., loan amounts and pattern of on-time 
repayments) and negative information (e.g., late payments, number and amount of defaults and 
bankruptcies) are distributed; (ii) data on both firms and individuals are distributed; (iii) data from 
retailers, trade creditors and utility companies are distributed to financial institutions; (iv) more 
than two years of historical data are distributed; (v) data on loans below 1% of income per capita 
are distributed; and (vi) regulations are provided to guarantee borrowers the right to access their 
data in the largest registry in the economy. The index ranges from zero to six, with higher values 
indicating the better availability of credit information, from either a public registry or a private 
bureau, to facilitate lending decisions. The index is set to zero for countries without a credit 
registry. 
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In addition, we employ two more detailed measures of information sharing: (i) Private 
Credit Bureau Coverage and Public Credit Registry Coverage measure the extent of coverage of 
individuals and companies by private or public registries as a percentage of the adult population; 
and (ii) six indicator variables capture the above mentioned six features of public or private 
registries: Positive/Negative Information, Firms/Individuals Covered, Trade/ Retailers 
Information, Historical Data, Small Loans Covered, and Borrowers’ Rights. 7 
 
4.2 Measuring legal rights of creditors and borrowers 
LLSV (1998) develop a creditor rights index to measure the powers of secured creditors in 
bankruptcy. The creditor rights index is obtained by adding a score of one for each of the following 
provisions of creditor protections: (i) there are restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum 
dividends, for a debtor to file for reorganization; (ii) the bankruptcy laws prohibit an automatic 
stay on assets; (iii) secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt 
firm; and (iv) creditors can dismiss managers and replace them with administrators when a firm 
becomes bankrupt. We use the Creditor Rights variable reported in DMS (2007), who introduce 
time-variations in the index due to reforms of bankruptcy laws. The index ranges from zero (weak 
creditor rights) to four (strong creditor rights).  
Legal rights of creditors as well as borrowers are likely to influence the maturity horizon 
at which lending and borrowing activities take place. For example, collateral of borrowers can be 
                                                      
7 Each of these proxies for the quality of credit information has its own advantages and disadvantages. The credit 
bureau coverage variables have more cross-country and time-series variation than indicator variables, but they may 
be predominantly driven by the coverage of retail borrowers rather than corporate loans. This problem is less 
pronounced for public credit registries, as most of them have loan cut-off minimum amounts, usually excluding retail 
or small business loans. Additionally, we find that countries with higher coverage of private credit bureaus also have 
higher percentage of firms rated by either S&P or Moody's (the correlation coefficient is 0.38 and statistically 
significant). 
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motivated as a contractual device to increase lenders’ incentive to monitor (Rajan and Winton, 
1995). This may reduce the use of short-term debt as a commitment device. As robustness checks, 
we use the Legal Rights index, as reported in the World Bank/IFC Doing Business database, to 
measure the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and 
lenders. The legal rights index includes eight aspects related to legal rights in collateral law and 
two aspects in bankruptcy law. A score of one is added for each of the following features of the 
laws: (i) any business may use movable assets as collateral while keeping possession of the assets, 
and any financial institution may accept such assets as collateral; (ii) the law allows a business to 
grant a non-possessory security right in a single category of revolving movable assets (such as 
accounts receivable or inventory), without requiring a specific description of the secured assets; 
(iii) the law allows a business to grant a non-possessory security right in substantially all of its 
assets, without requiring a specific description of the secured assets; (iv) a security right may 
extend to future or after-acquired assets and may extend automatically to the products, proceeds 
or replacements of the original assets; (v) general description of debts and obligations is permitted 
in collateral agreements and in registration documents; (vi) a collateral registry is in operation that 
is unified geographically and by asset type and that is indexed by the name of the grantor of a 
security right; (vii) secured creditors are paid first (e.g., before general tax claims and employee 
claims) when a debtor defaults outside an insolvency procedure; (viii) secured creditors are paid 
first when a business is liquidated; (ix) secured creditors are not subject to an automatic stay or 
moratorium on enforcement procedures when a debtor enters a court supervised reorganization 
procedure; and (x) the law allows parties to agree in a collateral agreement that the lender may 
enforce its security right out of court. The index ranges from zero to ten, with higher scores 
indicating that collateral and bankruptcy laws are better designed to facilitate lending. In addition 
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to using the aggregate index, we also use ten indicator variables to capture the individual 
components of the index: Movable Assets, Revolving Movable Assets, All Assets, Future Assets, 
General Description of Debt, Collateral Registry, Secured Creditors Paid First (Outside 
Procedure), Secured Creditors Paid First (In Liquidation), No Automatic Stay, and Enforcement 
Out of Court. Note that Movable Assets will be dropped from the regressions due to the lack of 
variability. 
 
4.3 Country controls and firm characteristics 
The differences in corporate debt maturity structures across countries may reflect varying 
quality of legal institutions and contracting environments (see Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
1998). Both laws and the actual enforcement of laws matter for debt contracting. We control for 
the level of enforcement and corruption in the legal system by using the (reverse of) Corruption 
perception indices provided by Transparency International. In addition, the enforcement procedure 
of debt contracts varies across countries. Based on Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008), 
we include an indicator variable Bankruptcy Code that equals one if an insolvent firm is mostly 
likely to undergo a liquidation or reorganization proceeding. It equals zero if the firm is mostly 
likely to undergo foreclosure.   
Macroeconomic variables may also influence firms’ choices of debt maturity. In particular, 
GDP growth rate is a proxy for the growth opportunity faced by firms (Smith and Watts, 1992), 
and the inflation rate provides evidence for firms and banks on whether the local currency is a 
stable or risky measure of value to be used in long-term contracting. Hence we include among our 
controls the growth rate of GDP per capita as well as indices of consumer price inflation. A dummy 
22 
 
variable is also added to control for any structural differences between developed and developing 
economies not already captured by other explanatory variables.  
In order to control for characteristics of the local banking sector and the degree of domestic 
financial development, we use the ratio of total deposits in the financial system to GDP, the 
coverage ratio of deposit insurance to deposits per capita as reported in Demirguc-Kunt, Kane and 
Laeven (2014) and whether or not a country experiences a systemic banking crisis in a given year 
as defined in Laeven and Valencia (2010).   
Finally, we use a set of micro-level variables to control for the differences in firm 
characteristics across countries. The choice of these variables is based on the prior literature. First, 
larger firms may face lower information asymmetries and reduced financial constraints. Therefore 
we control for firm size by using the natural logarithm of firms’ total assets. Second, the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets is included to reflect the maturity structure of firms’ assets. Firms with 
more fixed assets have higher collateral value but lower asset liquidity (Grudes and Opler, 1996) 
and tend to raise more long-term debt in order to match the maturity of their assets and liabilities 
(Stohs and Mauer, 1996). Third, we use the return on assets to capture profitability and liquidity 
of firms. Fourth, the debt to value ratio is included to control for firms’ leverage (Barclay, Marx, 
and Smith, 2003). The ratio is defined as total debt (short-term and long-term debt) divided by 
market value of a firm, which is the sum of market value of equity, and book value of preferred 
stocks and total debt. Fifth, we include the market to book ratio to control for the growth prospect 
and the potential collateral value of assets. All of firm-characteristics variables are winsorized at 
the 1% each tail to ensure that our results are not driven by outliers. 
 
4.4 Summary Statistics 
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We start with a brief summary of the key variables that will enter into our analysis. As 
reported in Table 1, China has the highest average short-term debt ratio (78%), whereas the United 
States has the lowest (28%), at about one-third of China’s. There is a clustering of developing 
countries at the top of the range, such as Turkey and Thailand, indicating that firms in lower-
income countries use more short-term debt as a proportion of total debt. Table 2 presents summary 
statistics for the variables used in our regression analysis. The average short-term debt to total debt 
ratio is 51% for firms across 45 countries over the 1991-2010 period. The average Depth of Credit 
Information across countries is 5 out of the maximum value of 6, whereas the average Creditor 
Rights index is 2 out of 4. More details on variable definitions and data sources are provided in 
the Appendix. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1 Information sharing and creditor rights as determinants of corporate debt maturity 
We attempt to disentangle the impact of better credit information and stronger creditor 
rights by estimating the following pooled regression: 
STD/TD = f (Information Sharing, Creditor Rights, Information Sharing*Creditor Rights, 
Country Controls, Firm Characteristics, Industry Dummies, Year Dummies) 
where the dependent variable STD/TD is the short-term debt to total debt ratio of a firm in 
each year. The interaction term between Information Sharing and Creditor Rights is included to 
test the substitution hypothesis. Our estimation sample contains firm-year observations for 45 
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countries over 20 years. In all of the regressions we use standard errors two-way clustered by year 
and by firm to allow for dependence across firms over time.8  
Country Controls consist of variables on Legal Environment, Macroeconomic 
Environment, and Financial Development. We include a Corruption index and a Bankruptcy Code 
indicator as measures of the Legal Environment. In addition, GDP Growth, Inflation, and a 
Developed Country dummy are included to control for the Macroeconomic Environment. 
Furthermore, we use three variables to capture the degree of domestic Financial Development 
which may influence firms’ debt maturity choices, namely the Deposit to GDP ratio, the coverage 
ratio of Deposit Insurance and a Banking Crisis indicator.  
As discussed earlier, it is important to control for firm-level factors which may influence 
firms’ debt maturity choices. Therefore we also include five variables to account for specific Firm 
Characteristics: Log of Total Assets, the Fixed Assets to Total Assets ratio, Return on Assets, the 
Debt to Value ratio and the Market to Book ratio. All regressions include industry indicator 
variables based on two-digit SIC code and year indicators to control for economic cycles. 9 
Table 3 presents the baseline results. We find that higher levels of information sharing in 
a country are associated with lower short-term to total debt ratios in the corporate sector. This 
holds for each of the information sharing measures (i.e. the presence of Information Sharing 
institutions and the Depth of credit information). The presence of a credit registry reduces the 
                                                      
8 We take the conservative approach by estimating two-way clustered standard errors: if we remove the time clustering, 
the statistical significance of our results is stronger.  
9 We also test whether firm heterogeneity or country heterogeneity is a more important driver of corporate debt 
maturity, by comparing the R2 of two regressions: one in which the firm-level regressors (including industry fixed 
effects) are removed, and another in which the country-level variables (including information and legal environment) 
are removed. Results suggest that both firm heterogeneity and country heterogeneity are of similar levels of importance 
in explaining corporate debt maturity, i.e. each of them explains 12% of variations of corporate debt maturity measured 
by adjusted R2.   
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average short-term to total debt ratio by 19% for a country with zero creditor rights. The reduction 
is approximately 4% for a country at the mean value of the creditor rights index (-
0.188+0.073*2.08 = -3.6%). The results are statistically significant as well as economically 
significant given the average short-term to total debt ratio of 51% in our sample. The results 
support our theory that information sharing helps mitigate the problems of adverse selection and 
ex-post moral hazard. Information sharing makes firms resort less to costly signalling of borrowing 
short term. We also find that weaker protection of creditor rights is associated with higher levels 
of short-term debt. This supports the hypothesis that short-term debt acts as a commitment device 
to limit ex-post diversion of cash flows.  
As explained in Section 3, ex ante better credit information may be a substitute for ex post 
stronger protection for creditor rights. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find an important 
interactive effect between information sharing and creditor rights. The presence of information 
sharing appears to attenuate the positive effects of creditor rights on debt maturity. Put it 
differently, corporate debt maturity is less sensitive to creditor rights (information sharing) in the 
presence of information sharing (strong creditor protection). For example, the negative effects of 
creditor rights on short-term debt are virtually cancelled in the presence of information sharing 
(the marginal effects of creditor rights = -0.054 + 0.073 * D Information Sharing = 1.9%). 
Similarly, the negative effects of information sharing on short-term debt are largely eliminated for 
a mean level of creditor rights index of 2.08 (the marginal effects of depth of credit information = 
-0.031 + 0.014 * 2.08 = -0.2%). This suggests that when creditors have strong power ex post, e.g. 
to replace firms’ management in bankruptcy, they may be willing to lend long-term even in the 
absence of information sharing.  
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In a theory of financial structure based on the degree of legal protection of creditor rights 
and on legal enforcement costs, Diamond (2004) predicts that firms’ debt will be short-term when 
legal enforcement is costly or corrupt. In line with the theory, we find that a higher level of 
corruption is associated with higher ratios of short-term to total corporate debt. Furthermore, we 
find that debt enforcement with a bankruptcy procedure (i.e. liquidation or reorganization) 
increases the use of short-term debt relative debt enforcement with foreclosure. This finding is in 
contrast to that of Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012) who show that the existence of an explicit 
bankruptcy code is associated with greater use of long-term debt.  
As for macroeconomic fundamentals, firms in developed countries use on average 16% 
less short-term debt than firms in developing countries. We also find that corporate debt maturity 
is influenced by the development of the domestic financial sector. On average, countries with a 
larger amount of (short-term) deposits in the banking sector, compared to the size of the economy, 
are characterized by a higher share of short-term corporate debt. This result is similar to the finding 
by Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012) who argue that banks as suppliers of capital with short-term 
liabilities have a comparative advantage of holding short-term debt. We also find that firms use 
more long-term debt in countries with better coverage of deposit insurance schemes.  
Furthermore, several firm characteristics appear important in explaining corporate debt 
maturity structures across countries. In line with our expectations, larger, more profitable firms, 
and firms with more tangible assets or better growth prospects obtain easier access to long-term 
finance. In addition, leverage is positively associated with debt maturity, consistent with the prior 
literature (Barclay, Marx, and Smith, 2003; Johnson, 2003). 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 present results of the first and second half of our sample 
periods, respectively. Results are similar with the following exceptions. First, inflation increases 
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the use of short-term debt in 1990s, but not in the post 2000 period. Second, firms use more short-
term debt in countries with a systemic banking crisis in 1990s. However, this does not hold in more 
recent banking crises in 2001-2010.    
We also employ alternative measures of information sharing and creditor rights in our 
analysis. Results are shown in Table 4. In line with previous results, we find that improvements in 
the coverage of private and public credit registries increase firms’ access to long-term finance. 
Among the components of the depth of credit information index, two aspects of credit registries 
seem to matter significantly: whether both positive and negative credit information are reported, 
and whether credit information from a wide range of sources (e.g. trade creditors, retailers, and 
utility companies) are included. 
Column 3 of Table 4 also report results with alternative measures of legal rights of creditors 
and borrowers. Laws allowing secured creditors to be paid first in bankruptcy or right of 
enforcement out of court have a significant impact on corporate debt maturity. In addition, certain 
aspects of the collateral law, especially those regarding the extent to which firms can use their 
assets as collateral, also seem to matter. This is consistent with the use of collateral as a contractual 
device to increase lenders’ incentive to monitor (Rajan and Winton, 1995; Vig, 2013). This reduces 
the use of short-term debt as a commitment device. The interaction between credit information and 
legal rights remains significant. 
The overall conclusion of the above empirical analysis is that – controlling for other macro 
and micro characteristics – information sharing among creditors and legal protection of creditor 
rights are crucial determinants of firms’ debt maturity choices around the world. Information 
sharing acts as a substitute for creditor protection in lengthening debt maturity. 
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5.2 Alternative dependant variables and estimation methods 
We use different measures of debt maturity structure. First, following Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999), we use the ratio of short-term debt to total assets (STD/TA). Second, trade 
credit is an important source of financing for firms around the world (Fisman and Love, 2003). 
Therefore we use the ratio of accounts payable to total assets to capture trade credit. Third, we 
include trade credit in our measure of short-term debt by using (STD + Payables) /TA. We drop 
observations if the short-term debt to total debt ratio (STD/TD) is missing, to make our sample 
size similar to that in the previous section. We drop the leverage ratio in our regressions as the 
short-term debt to total asset ratio is mechanically correlated with the total debt ratio.   
The results as reported in Table 5 confirm our previous results. Several interesting findings 
emerge. First, while firms in developed countries rely less on short-term debt, they use more trade 
credit than firms in developing countries. Second, a systemic banking crisis is associated with 
more short-term debt but less trade credit in a firm’s balance sheet.  
We examine the extent to which our results are driven by the cross-sectional variation in 
our explanatory variables. Following Fama-MacBeth’s (1973) approach, we run cross-sectional 
regressions for each of the 20 years in our sample and then average coefficient estimates across 
the 20 years. Newey and West’s standard errors are calculated with three lags to adjust for time-
series correlation. The results are very similar to those reported for pooled regressions (see the 
internet appendix).  
 
5.3 Endogeneity issues: instrumental variables and difference-in-difference estimations 
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This section investigates potential endogeneity issues in our regressions. First, we 
investigate the reverse causality between the maturity structure of corporate debt and credit 
information-sharing institutions. Based on available evidence it also appears that the establishment 
of credit bureaus across countries has been driven by exogenous factors other than the availability 
of long-term corporate debt markets, including the growth of retail credit markets (Vietnam), a 
minimum size of the economy (Central America), the existence of a regulatory framework for 
information sharing (Egypt), the adoption of standardized formats for credit data reporting (South 
Africa) and the development of information technology (IFC, 2006). Hence the potential for 
reverse causality in our regression is very limited. However, to be conservative, we use an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach to instrument information sharing and creditor rights by 
exogenous variations across countries. 
The selection of instrumental variables is based on the law and finance literature. As legal 
origins of a country are determined exogenously e.g. by colonial power and history (LLSV, 1999; 
Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005), we use legal origins (English, French, German, Nordic and 
Socialist) as instruments for measures of information sharing and creditor rights. In addition, 
political and financial institutions are also shaped by a country’s culture heritage and religious 
composition (Stulz and Williamson, 2003). They should not have a direct impact on debt maturity. 
Therefore we include the composition of religions of a country (Buddhist, Catholic, Muslim, 
Orthodox Christian, and Protestant) as additional instruments.  
Table 6 presents the empirical results of two-stage least squares regressions when variables 
of information sharing and creditor rights (and their interactions) are instrumented. The 
coefficients of variables on information sharing and creditor rights remain negative and significant. 
This confirms our finding that information sharing and creditor protection help lengthen corporate 
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debt maturity. The interaction term between creditor rights and information sharing institutions is 
positive and significant. Other controls at the country and the firm levels yield similar results to 
those reported before. 
Second, we turn to investigate the potential omitted variables problem in our regressions. 
Many countries started their public or private credit bureaus during our sample period. We use 
them as our laboratory for quasi-natural experiments. For instance, Thailand established her first 
credit bureau in 1999. Afterwards the average short-term to total debt ratios for firms in the country 
dropped by 9% compared to the years prior to the establishment of credit bureaus. In addition, 
according to the Loanware/Bondware Capital Markets database, the average maturity of loans and 
bonds for borrowers in Thailand increases by 40% after the establishment of credit bureaus than 
before. Panel A of Table 7 presents the list of 12 countries that established credit registries (either 
public or private) during our sample period.  We employ a difference-in-difference approach to 
exploit the time-series and cross-sectional variations in corporate debt maturities around these 
institutional reforms in credit reporting systems. Regressions are estimated over either a 7-year 
window (i.e. from 3 years prior to the establishment year to 3 years after the establishment) or an 
11-year window (i.e. from 5 years prior to the establishment year to 5 years after the 
establishment). The dependent variable is the short-term debt to total debt of firms (STD/TD).  
Reforms in credit reporting systems affect all firms in the country. There is no natural 
candidate for the control set of firms that are not affected by the reform. But smaller firms, who 
suffer from higher information asymmetry, are likely to be more affected by the reform than larger 
ones. Following Vig (2013), we use larger firms in a country as the control group and the smaller 
firms in the country as the treatment group. Specifically, D Treatment is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a firm’s size is below that of the median firm in the country in a given year, and zero 
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otherwise. It captures the cross-sectional differences in debt maturity between the treatment and 
control groups before reforms. D PostCR is a dummy variable that equals one if a country has 
established a credit registry (either public or private), and zero otherwise. Hence the interaction 
term is our difference-in-difference estimator. We include country fixed effects to control for 
cross-country differences in legal, institutional, and macroeconomic conditions. All regressions 
also include industry and year dummies. Firm characteristics include the same set of firm-level 
control variables as in other regressions, i.e. Log of Total Assets, the Fixed Assets to Total Assets 
ratio, Return on Assets, the Debt to Value ratio and the Market to Book ratio. Standard errors are 
two-way clustered by year and by firm.  
Panel B reports the regression results. Regressions in the first two columns are run without 
D Treatment and the interaction term. Hence the coefficient on D PostCR captures the time-series 
difference in debt maturity. We find that short-term debt is reduced by 1% following the 
establishment of credit bureaus in a country. This is statistically significant for a 7-year estimation 
window around the reform. The last two columns report results for difference-in-difference 
estimations. The interaction term D PostCR*Treatment is negative and statistically significant. It 
suggests that the net effect of establishing information-sharing institutions is a 5% reduction in the 
short-term debt to total debt ratio. This supports a causal effect from information sharing to debt 
maturity.  
 
5.4 Other robustness checks 
We have performed a number of further robustness checks for our results. First, additional 
control variables are included. As the term structure of interest rates are important for debt maturity 
choices, we include the term spread proxied as the difference between 10-year government bond 
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yields and 3-months rates of treasury bills (see e.g., Brick and Ravid, 1985). We also calculate 
Altman’s (1968) Z-score to measure the credit risk of a firm. Alternative macro- and micro-
economic variables are such as bank concentration and non-performing loans (see Brown, Jappelli, 
and Pagano, 2009). The corruption index is replaced by the Rule of Law variable obtained from 
International Country Risk Guide. Furthermore, to ensure that firms from a small number of 
countries do not overly drive our results, we include a dummy variable for China and the U.S. in 
our regressions to absorb their effects on short-term debt, and hence remove their potential 
influence on other coefficients. Our main results are robust to these alternative specifications of 
the model. Tables are available upon requests. 
Second, firms’ debt maturity and leverage may be simultaneously determined by the 
contracting environment (Myers, 1977; Barclay, Marx, and Smith, 2003; Johnson, 2003). To 
address the potential endogeneity in firms’ leverage, we use the IV analysis where a firm’s leverage 
ratio is instrumented by that of the industry median (excluding the firm). Our main results 
regarding information sharing and creditor rights remain the same as those reported before (Tables 
are available upon request). The only difference compared with the previous results is that using 
this IV analysis, debt maturity is negatively associated with leverage.10 
Third, we test if our results are different for developed and developing countries. We 
interact a dummy variable for developing countries with our key variables of interest, i.e. credit 
information, creditor rights, and their interactions. While our results work in the same direction as 
                                                      
10 Our theoretical model on debt maturity does not generate a clear prediction on how the debt maturity decision 
interacts with the leverage decision, as the use of equity is not justified in the model. In particular, equityholders do 
not incur cost of financial distress and cannot liquidate a firm if dividends are not paid. Therefore, in our model, equity 
does not deal with the two frictions of asymmetric information and diversion. More broadly speaking, short-term debt 
is a better instrument in dealing with these frictions than long-term debt and equity. Thus, if the information and legal 
environment prevents firms from issuing long-term debt or equity, the firms rely on short term debt, or raise no capital 
at all. 
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before for both sets of economies, the results are significantly stronger, both economically and 
statistically, in developed countries than developing countries. The difference may come from the 
empirical proxy of the developing country dummy picking up factors that are not yet modelled in 
our theoretical framework.11 A possible explanation is that developing countries have relatively 
weak enforcement of rules that are not captured by our control variable corruption: e.g. if better 
nominal rules on credit information and creditor rights are not fully enforced in practice, they have 
a smaller real effect on debt maturity in developing countries than developed countries. 
Fourth, we examine whether the development of domestic financial sectors, as well as 
firms’ characteristics, may be co-determined with firms’ debt maturity choices. To address this 
issue, we use one-year lagged values of financial development variables and firm characteristics 
variables as instruments. This approach assumes that past values of these variables are correlated 
with their current values but not with the current error terms. The results confirm our main results 
reported in Section 5.1.  
 
6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The limited availability of long-term funds is a common problem faced by many firms 
around the world. Although the negative implications of excessive short-term borrowing on growth 
and stability are well known, there is no consensus on its underlying determinants and hence the 
main priorities for reform. The key feature of this paper is that the interaction between asymmetric 
                                                      
11 In our theoretical framework, we have assumed that the diversion problem proxied by θ is negatively related to 
creditor rights. If the relation is less negative in developing countries than developed countries, e.g. due to differences 
in rule enforcement, the effects of better rules on credit information and creditor rights will generate a smaller effect 
on debt maturity in developing countries. 
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information and creditor rights is an important determinant of debt maturity. More specifically, a 
reduction in information asymmetry has a stronger effect on debt maturity when creditor rights are 
weaker. 
From a theoretical standpoint, short-term debt plays a dual role in our model: i) as a 
signalling device to overcome ex-ante information asymmetry, and ii) as a commitment device to 
restrict ex-post diversion of cash flows. The relative importance of the two roles depends on the 
degree of creditor protection. In particular, the commitment role of short-term debt is more 
important than the signalling role when creditor rights are relatively weak. As information sharing 
among creditors facilitates debt enforcement, it reduces the use of short-term debt as a commitment 
device in relatively weak legal environments.  
Using panel data from 45 developed and developing countries, we find that better credit 
information (as proxied by the existence and quality of private and public credit registries) and 
stronger creditor rights are associated with a higher share of long-term debt as a proportion of total 
corporate debt. Most importantly, information sharing acts as a substitute for creditor protection 
in lengthening debt maturity: the presence of information sharing (strong creditor protection) 
attenuates the influence of creditor rights (information sharing) on debt maturity. This suggests 
that when creditors have better information about borrowers ex ante, they may be willing to lend 
long-term even in the absence of strong legal protection ex post.  
The empirical results are robust to a number of estimation strategies. Reforms of credit 
reporting systems around the world are used as our laboratory for quasi-natural experiments. 
Results from the difference-in-difference estimations support a causal relation from information 
sharing to debt maturity. 
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The result does not imply that, in and of itself, better credit information or stronger creditor 
rights is a sufficient condition for developing long-term corporate debt markets. Countries, 
especially less developed, face challenges in developing strong institutions and rule enforcement. 
Our results do suggest, however, that an improvement in credit reporting systems acts as a 
substitute for relatively weak creditor protection and increases the maturity horizon at which 
financial institutions feel safe to lend. Better credit information would contribute to lengthening 
the maturity of corporate debt thus placing firms on a more solid footing to avoid rollover risks 
and exploit their full growth potential. 
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Table 1: The sample 
 
This table presents a description of the sample. Average STD/TD is the average short-term debt (i.e. less than one year 
maturity) divided by total debt across firms in a country. Definitions of other variables are in the Appendix. 
Country Number of Average Average Average 
 Firm-years STD/TD 
Credit Info 
Index 
Creditor 
Rights 
Argentina 1,218 54% 6 1 
Australia 7,786 45% 5 3 
Austria 1,529 52% 6 3 
Belgium 2,093 45% 4 2 
Brazil 4,777 51% 5 1 
Canada 26,990 42% 6 1 
Chile 2,596 42% 5 2 
China, PRC 21,712 78% 3.7 2 
Czech Republic 558 55% 2.0 3 
Denmark 3,105 43% 4 3 
Finland 2,434 34% 5 1.2 
France 13,185 49% 4 0 
Germany 13,190 49% 6 3 
Greece 4,046 65% 4.6 1 
Hong Kong SAR 10,930 62% 4.5 4 
Hungary 514 61% 4.6 1 
India 15,842 42% 2.6 2 
Indonesia 3,957 59% 3.6 2.2 
Ireland 1,331 39% 5 1 
Israel 3,526 49% 5 3 
Italy 4,162 53% 5.1 2 
Japan 61,082 58% 6 2.2 
Korea, Rep. 15,261 62% 5.5 3 
Luxembourg 484 29% 0  
Malaysia 12,026 63% 6 3 
Mexico 2,100 42% 6 0 
Netherlands 3,514 43% 5 3 
New Zealand 1,712 36% 5 4 
Norway 3,224 29% 4 2 
Pakistan 2,257 59% 3.9 1 
Peru 1,252 56% 6 0 
Philippines 2,466 58% 2.5 1 
Poland 2,969 60% 3.6 1 
Portugal 1,170 49% 5 1 
Russia 3,036 63% 2.3 2 
Singapore 7,475 62% 2.8 3 
South Africa 5,308 49% 5.9 3 
Spain 2,538 48% 5 2 
Sweden 6,128 36% 4 1.1 
Switzerland 3,667 36% 5 1 
Taiwan, China 15,041 67% 5 2 
Thailand 6,333 64% 3.8 2.2 
Turkey 2,888 67% 5 2 
United Kingdom 30,985 48% 6 4 
United States 53,054 28% 6 1 
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Table 2: Summary statistics  
 
This table presents the summary statistics for our data. STD/TD is the short-term debt (i.e. less than one year maturity) 
divided by total debt of a firm. Definitions of other variables are in the Appendix. Variables with a prefix “D” are 
binary dummies. 
Variables Mean St.Dev 25th Perc. Median 75th Perc. Min Max 
STD/TD 0.51 0.34 0.20 0.49 0.84 0.00 1.00 
Size 11.85 2.13 10.51 11.81 13.18 5.94 17.18 
Fixed Assets 0.32 0.24 0.12 0.28 0.48 0.00 0.93 
ROA -0.03 0.27 -0.01 0.03 0.07 -1.85 0.32 
Leverage 0.27 0.26 0.03 0.20 0.44 0.00 0.92 
Market to Book 2.38 3.66 0.79 1.46 2.68 -6.16 25.46 
Depth of Credit Info 5.15 1.29 5.00 6.00 6.00 0.00 6.00 
Creditor Rights 2.08 1.08 1.00 2.00 3.00 0.00 4.00 
D Developed Country 0.73 0.45 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Corruption 3.86 2.07 2.00 3.40 5.70 0.00 9.43 
D Bankruptcy Code 0.77 0.42 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
GDP growth 2.80 3.44 1.19 2.45 4.29 -16.30 23.26 
Inflation 2.91 4.99 1.03 2.14 3.32 -5.03 55.00 
Deposit /GDP 88.54 42.58 59.19 80.24 110.45 17.37 319.02 
Deposit Insurance 
coverage 1.42 0.99 1.04 1.31 2.12 0.00 5.28 
D Banking Crisis 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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 Table 3: Determinants of debt maturity structure 
The dependent variable is the short-term debt to total debt of firms (STD/TD). Definitions of other variables are in 
Appendix. The absolute values of t-statistics are in brackets, calculated with standard errors two-way clustered by year 
and by firm. All regressions include industry dummies and year dummies. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  1 2 3 (1991-2000) 4 (2001-2010) 
D Info Share -0.188    
 [3.56]***    
Depth of Credit Info  -0.031 -0.041 -0.025 
    [5.31]*** [5.28]*** [3.24]*** 
Creditor Rights -0.054 -0.055 -0.063 -0.044 
  [2.97]*** [5.24]*** [5.97]*** [2.93]*** 
D Info Share * Creditor Rights 0.073    
 [4.26]***    
Depth of Credit Info *Creditor Rights   0.014 0.016 0.011 
    [7.11]*** [6.84]*** [4.08]*** 
Corruption 0.034 0.034 0.029 0.033 
 [30.04]*** [27.22]*** [11.95]*** [14.72]*** 
D Bankruptcy Code 0.06 0.064 0.029 0.082 
  [5.84]*** [6.82]*** [2.45]** [13.50]*** 
D Developed Country -0.161 -0.154 -0.145 -0.152 
 [23.53]*** [20.47]*** [14.73]*** [11.40]*** 
GDP growth -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
 [1.56] [0.87] [0.23] [0.25] 
Inflation 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 
  [1.32] [1.98]** [6.39]*** [0.01] 
Deposits /GDP 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [9.12]*** [9.59]*** [8.20]*** [7.89]*** 
Deposit Insurance Coverage -0.034 -0.033 -0.018 -0.039 
 [11.47]*** [9.68]*** [3.69]*** [9.02]*** 
D Banking Crisis -0.007 -0.006 0.035 -0.016 
  [0.61] [0.54] [2.96]*** [0.91] 
Size -0.040 -0.039 -0.031 -0.043 
 [27.10]*** [26.62]*** [23.54]*** [32.36]*** 
Fixed Assets -0.243 -0.235 -0.328 -0.196 
 [13.17]*** [13.08]*** [36.09]*** [12.14]*** 
ROA -0.037 -0.041 -0.086 -0.027 
 [5.89]*** [6.06]*** [5.99]*** [5.36]*** 
Leverage -0.071 -0.074 -0.052 -0.092 
 [7.65]*** [7.90]*** [4.08]*** [10.04]*** 
Market to Book -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
 [6.26]*** [6.53]*** [2.71]*** [8.98]*** 
Constant 1.172 1.117 1.077 1.145 
  [17.58]*** [34.04]*** [28.14]*** [23.97]*** 
Observations 263,152 263,152 93,390 169,762 
R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.25 
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Table 4: More detailed measures of information sharing and creditor rights 
The dependent variable is the short-term debt to total debt of firms (STD/TD). Definitions of other variables are in 
Appendix. The absolute values of t-statistics are in brackets, calculated with standard errors two-way clustered by year 
and by firm. All regressions include industry dummies and year dummies. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  1 2 3 
Private CB Coverage -0.001   
 [6.23]***   
Public CR Coverage -0.002   
 [4.01]***   
Positive/Negative Information   -0.025  
  [3.19]***  
Firms/Individuals Covered   -0.011  
  [1.45]  
Trade/Retailers Information   -0.044  
  [6.93]***  
Historical Data  0.007  
  [0.86]  
Small Loans Covered  0.024  
  [1.75]*  
Borrowers’ Rights  -0.01  
  [0.54]  
Depth of Credit Info   -0.009 
      [1.51] 
Creditor Rights -0.017 -0.015  
 [2.93]*** [1.23]  
Revolving Movable Assets  -0.005 
   [0.77] 
All Assets   -0.025 
   [3.83]*** 
Future Assets   -0.017 
   [2.34]** 
General Description of Debt  0.09 
   [3.48]*** 
Collateral Registry   0.000 
   [0.00] 
Secured Creditors Paid First   -0.007 
(outside procedure)   [1.08] 
Secured Creditors Paid First   -0.08 
(in liquidation)   [8.74]*** 
No Automatic Stay   0.010 
   [1.45] 
Enforcement Out of Court  -0.027 
      [3.78]*** 
Private Credit Bureau Cov. * Creditor 
Rights 0.000   
 [1.92]*   
Public Credit Registry Cov. * Creditor 
Rights 0.001   
 [4.12]***   
Depth of Credit Information * Creditor 
Rights   0.007  
  [3.34]***  
Depth of Credit Information * Legal Rights    0.002 
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      [2.55]** 
Corruption 0.032 0.035 0.025 
 [24.99]*** [27.93]*** [10.53]*** 
D Bankruptcy Code 0.071 0.069 -0.011 
  [6.99]*** [6.29]*** [1.41] 
D Developed Country -0.126 -0.158 -0.158 
 [12.82]*** [18.71]*** [22.02]*** 
GDP growth -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 [0.72] [1.35] [0.20] 
Inflation 0.000 0.001 0.000 
  [0.91] [1.69]* [0.34] 
Deposits /GDP 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [6.59]*** [4.32]*** [9.11]*** 
Deposit Insurance Coverage -0.03 -0.039 -0.035 
 [7.81]*** [10.93]*** [10.55]*** 
D Banking Crisis 0.002 -0.005 0.001 
  [0.15] [0.40] [0.18] 
Size -0.039 -0.039 -0.039 
 [24.51]*** [25.69]*** [24.57]*** 
Fixed Assets -0.237 -0.235 -0.241 
 [13.24]*** [13.17]*** [14.60]*** 
ROA -0.045 -0.042 -0.036 
 [5.95]*** [6.15]*** [5.10]*** 
Leverage -0.077 -0.075 -0.072 
 [8.61]*** [8.23]*** [7.88]*** 
Market to Book -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
  [6.17]*** [6.47]*** [6.27]*** 
Constant 0.987 1.012 1.112 
  [37.21]*** [26.75]*** [29.46]*** 
Observations 255,724 263,152 263,152 
R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.25 
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Table 5: Alternative measures of debt maturity structure 
The dependent variables are STD/TA, Payables/TA, and (STD + Payables)/TA, respectively. STD/TA is short-term 
debt divided by total asset of a firm. Payables/TA is account payables divided by total asset of a firm. (STD + 
Payables)/TA is the sum of short-term debt and account payables divided by total asset of a firm. Definitions of other 
variables are in Appendix. The absolute values of t-statistics are in brackets, calculated with standard errors two-way 
clustered by year and by firm. All regressions include industry dummies and year dummies. *,**,*** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  1 2 3 
 STD/TA Payables/TA 
(STD + 
Payables)/TA 
Depth of Credit Info -0.012 -0.013 -0.028 
  [6.14]*** [9.50]*** [12.04]*** 
Creditor Rights -0.010 -0.040 -0.053 
  [2.35]** [13.77]*** [9.80]*** 
Depth of Credit Info *Creditor Rights 0.004 0.007 0.012 
 [6.16]*** [11.80]*** [13.44]*** 
Corruption 0.012 0.006 0.018 
 [18.37]*** [11.77]*** [22.28]*** 
D Bankruptcy Code 0.046 0.003 0.050 
  [13.24]*** [1.27] [11.41]*** 
D Developed Country -0.052 0.014 -0.039 
 [15.45]*** [3.28]*** [9.43]*** 
GDP growth 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
 [1.31] [7.45]*** [3.12]*** 
Inflation 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  [0.10] [2.29]** [0.80] 
Deposits /GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [5.50]*** [2.31]** [4.69]*** 
Deposit Insurance Coverage -0.009 -0.002 -0.010 
 [4.13]*** [2.03]** [3.53]*** 
D Banking Crisis 0.013 -0.013 -0.001 
  [2.57]** [2.71]*** [0.09] 
Size -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 
 [5.16]*** [9.11]*** [9.80]*** 
Fixed Assets 0.005 -0.105 -0.100 
 [0.83] [16.18]*** [7.72]*** 
ROA -0.150 -0.073 -0.220 
 [19.10]*** [14.95]*** [22.96]*** 
Market to Book -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
  [3.75]*** [2.78]*** [3.71]*** 
Constant 0.117 0.243 0.371 
  [5.27]*** [24.30]*** [13.58]*** 
Observations 265,910 248,591 248,591 
R-squared 0.18 0.17 0.22 
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Table 6: Instrumental variables estimations  
The dependent variables are STD/TA, Payables/TA, and (STD + Payables)/TA, respectively. STD/TA is short-term 
debt divided by total asset of a firm. Payables/TA is account payables divided by total asset of a firm. (STD + 
Payables)/TA is the sum of short-term debt and account payables divided by total asset of a firm. Definitions of other 
variables are in Appendix. The absolute values of z-statistics are in brackets, calculated with standard errors two-way 
clustered by year and by firm. All regressions include industry dummies and year dummies. *,**,*** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  1 2 3 
  STD/TD STD/TA 
(STD + 
Payables)/TA 
Depth of Credit Info -0.097 -0.030 -0.061 
  [10.45]*** [7.89]*** [9.54]*** 
Creditor Rights -0.191 -0.043 -0.117 
  [11.02]*** [4.87]*** [8.40]*** 
Depth of Credit Info *Creditor Rights 0.043 0.012 0.025 
  [11.61]*** [7.34]*** [10.06]*** 
Corruption 0.035 0.012 0.018 
 [22.19]*** [16.87]*** [19.76]*** 
D Bankruptcy Code 0.097 0.058 0.066 
  [6.35]*** [11.43]*** [10.92]*** 
D Developed Country -0.137 -0.047 -0.029 
 [13.89]*** [12.34]*** [7.13]*** 
GDP growth 0.002 0.002 -0.001 
 [0.88] [2.55]** [0.88] 
Inflation 0.001 0.000 -0.000 
  [2.26]** [0.23] [0.55] 
Deposits /GDP 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 [6.72]*** [5.36]*** [4.93]*** 
Deposit Insurance Coverage -0.029 -0.008 -0.008 
 [7.77]*** [3.32]*** [2.52]** 
D Banking Crisis -0.003 0.015 -0.000 
  [0.22] [2.55]** [0.04] 
Size -0.037 -0.002 -0.006 
 [31.81]*** [4.64]*** [9.43]*** 
Fixed Assets -0.217 0.009 -0.092 
 [11.94]*** [1.46] [7.04]*** 
ROA -0.052 -0.152 -0.225 
 [8.01]*** [20.23]*** [24.38]*** 
Leverage -0.086   
 [7.10]***   
Market to Book -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
  [7.14]*** [3.54]*** [3.64]*** 
Constant 1.322 0.164 0.477 
  [34.31]*** [6.11]*** [11.80]*** 
Observations 263,152 265,910 248,591 
R-squared 0.24 0.18 0.21 
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Table 7: Difference-in-Difference estimations  
Panel A presents the list of countries that established credit registries (either public or private) during our sample 
period. Panel B reports the regression results for time-series difference and difference-in-difference estimations. 
Regressions are estimated over either a 7-year window (-3,3) or a 11-year window (-5,5) around the establishment 
year. The dependent variable is the short-term debt to total debt of firms (STD/TD). D PostCR is a dummy variable 
that equals one if a country has established a credit registry (either public or private), and zero otherwise. D Treatment 
is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s size is below that of the median firm in the country in a given year, 
and zero otherwise. The interaction term is the difference-in-difference estimator. Firm characteristics include the 
same set of firm-level control variables as in other regressions. The absolute values of t-statistics are in brackets, 
calculated with standard errors two-way clustered by year and by firm. All regressions include country, industry 
dummies and year dummies. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: List of countries 
China Czech Greece Hungary India Korea 
Pakistan Philippines Poland Russia Singapore Thailand 
 
Panel B: Estimation results 
 Time-series difference Difference-in-Difference 
 (-3,3) (-5,5) (-3,3) (-5,5) 
D PostCR -0.012 -0.010 0.011 0.015 
 [2.32]** [0.90] [1.05] [1.01] 
D Treatment   0.041 0.051 
   [1.85]* [2.91]*** 
D PostCR*Treatment   -0.048 -0.052 
   [2.16]** [2.90]*** 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,098 29,890 18,098 29,890 
R-squared 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.28 
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Figure 1: Timeline of the model 
 
t=0               t=1               t=2 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Entrepreneurs issue debt to 
fund investment in projects of 
type S or R. Debt expires in 
either one period (short-term 
debt) or two periods (long-term 
debt). 
Short-term debt matures. The S-
type project yields cash-flow XS, 
and R-type yields cash-flow XR or 
0. Entrepreneurs may divert a 
fraction q of the cash-flow. If 
short-term debt is not fully repaid 
because of diversion, financiers 
may liquidate the project. 
Long-term debt matures. The S-
type project yields cash-flow 
XS, and R-type yields cash-flow 
XR. Entrepreneurs may divert a 
fraction q of the cash-flow. 
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Figure 2: Results of the model 
q
Pq
 
 
 
 
 
 
q  
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
FULL INFORMATION           ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
Both types of projects are 
financed by long-term 
debt only.  
Separating equilibrium: S-type project 
is financed by a mix of long-term debt 
and a small amount of short-term debt. 
R-type project is financed by long-term 
debt only. 
Pooling equilibrium: Both types of 
projects are financed by a mix of long-
term and short-term debt.  
The ratio of short-term debt to total 
debt increases with θ. 
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Figure 3: Numerical illustration of the model 
Suppose 3.0/,8.0,5.0 === INPVpl . Panel A plots the average short-term debt to total debt ratio, IVP
1  (see Eq. 
A12). Panel B plots the interest rates of long-term debt, short-term debt 1Pr (see Eq. A13), and total debt Pr (see Eq. 
A14).  
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
 
 Variables Descriptions and Data Source 
Share of Short-
Term Debt 
STD/TD Short-term debt (i.e. less than one year maturity) divided by total debt of a firm. 
Average across firms in each country. Source: Worldscope. 
 
Information 
Sharing 
  
D Information Sharing Dummy =1 if a private or public credit bureau exists. Source:  Doing Business 
(2006), Miller (2003), Love and Mylenko (2003), Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 
(2007) and World Development Indicators. 
Depth of Credit 
Information 
The index ranges from 0 to 6, with a score of 1 assigned for each of 
the following 6 features of the credit information system: 
. Both positive and negative credit information is distributed. 
. Data on both firms and individuals are distributed. 
. Data from retailers, trade creditors or utilities as well as financial 
institutions are distributed. 
. More than 2 years of historical data are distributed. 
. Data on loans above 1% of income per capita are distributed. 
. By law, borrowers have the right to access their data. 
The index is set to zero for countries without a credit registry. Source: World 
Development Indicators (WDI) 
Private Credit Bureau 
(D- / -Cov.) 
Variable with a prefix “D”: Dummy =1 if a private credit bureaus exists; Variable 
with a postfix “Cov.”: Private credit bureaus coverage as a % of the adult 
population. Source: Doing Business (2006), Miller (2003), Love and Mylenko 
(2003), Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) and WDI. 
Public Credit Registry 
(D- / -Cov.) 
Variable with a prefix “D”: Dummy =1 if a public credit registry exists; Variable 
with a postfix “Cov.”: Public credit registries coverage as a % of the adult 
population. Source: Doing Business (2006), Miller (2003), Love and Mylenko 
(2003), Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) and WDI. 
Creditor rights 
 
Creditor Rights Creditor right index (0 least - 4 most rights). Source: LLSV (1998) and Djankov, 
McLiesh and Shleifer (2006) 
Legal Rights Index of legal rights of borrowers and lenders (0 least - 10 most rights). Source: 
Doing Business (2010) 
Legal 
Environment 
Corruption Corruption perception index (reversed: 0 least - 10 most corrupted). Source: 
Transparency International 
Bankruptcy code Dummy = 1 if an insolvent firm is mostly likely to undergo a liquidation or 
reorganization proceeding, and = 0 it is mostly likely to undergo foreclosure. 
Source: Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer(2008). 
Financial 
Development 
Deposit /GDP Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions as a share of GDP. Source: IMF 
Deposit insurance 
coverage 
Log of one plus ratio of deposit insurance coverage to deposits per capita. Source: 
Demirguc-Kunt, Kane and Laeven (2014) 
D Banking Crisis Dummy =1 if there is a systemic banking crises, and =0 otherwise. Source: Laeven 
and Valencia (2010) 
Macro 
Environment 
GDP Growth Growth rate of GDP per capita. Source: WDI 
Inflation Consumer Price Inflation. Source: WDI 
D Developed Country Dummy =1 if the country is a developed country, and =0 if it is a developing 
country. The classification is based on Gross National Income per capita. Source: 
World Bank 
Firm 
Characteristics 
Log of Total Assets Natural logarithm of average total assets (in thousand US$). Source: Worldscope 
Return on Assets Return of assets (net income before interest divided by total assets of a firm). 
Source: Worldscope 
Fixed Assets /Total 
Assets 
Fixed assets (net property, plant and equipment) divided by total assets of a firm. 
Source: Worldscope 
Market to Book ratio 
Leverage 
Market value of equity divided by book value of equity. Source: Worldscope  
Total debt (short-term and long-term debt) divided by market value of a firm. 
Market value of a firm is the sum of market value of equity, and book value of 
preferred stocks and total debt. Source: Worldscope. 
